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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah abused its discretion and erred in deny-
ing the Plaintiff an opportunity to present new medical evidence 
at a hearing to support his claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no question that Plaintiff, Carl Jay Spencer, was 
injured in an industrial accident on November 11, 1982. Tr. 
304. On that date, while employed by N. V. Swire Bottlers, 
Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving an eighteen-
wheeler in Wyoming. Tr. 304. As a result of that accident, 
Plaintiff sustained multiple contusions of the head, arm and 
leg. Tr. 304. Plaintiff was discharged "although he was appar-
ently a little dazed.ff Tr. 304. The following day, November 12, 
1982, while driving an eighteen-wheeler back from Denver, Colo-
rado, Plaintiff blacked out, wrecking his truck and sustaining 
another head injury. Tr. 304. 
Plaintiff suffered from numerous problems including dizzi-
ness, forgetfulness, headaches, blackouts and blurred vision. 
Tr. 304. Plaintiff was treated by numerous doctors. The treat-
ments included a "psychiatric consultation" while convalescing at 
St. Marks Hospital. Tr. 304. 
In July, 1983, Plaintiff returned to work performing light 
duties. On September 9, 1983, however, Plaintiff was dismissed 
from his employment. Tr. 304. Though Plaintiff has been offered 
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employment as a truck driver, he was never hired once potential 
employers learned of Plaintiff's history of seizures. Tr. 304. 
On June 1, 1984, the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 
suffering from constant headaches, tenseness and soreness in his 
neck. Plaintiff also noticed loss of strength in his right arm 
and balance problems. Tr. 304. 
In about 1960 or 1961, Plaintiff had his toes frozen on his 
right foot, which gave him trouble until he had surgery on 
June 29, 1970. The Plaintiff did well until he dropped a garbage 
can on his toes in July, 1970 while working for Salt Lake City as 
a sanitation worker. His fourth and fifth toes and fifth meta-
tarsal head were eventually amputated. Tr. 305. 
The Plaintiff's next injury occurred on or about Septem-
ber 18, 1976. At that time, he was working for Salt Lake County 
and apparently sustained an injury to his left shoulder while 
working. Tr. 275, 305. 
On or about November 18, 1976, the Plaintiff sustained 
another injury to his left shoulder while lifting garbage cans. 
He was again lifting when he heard something tear in his left 
shoulder. On January 3, 1977, a surgical repair of the Plain-
tiff's left shoulder was performed. Tr. 275, 305. 
Following a formal hearing in this case, he was referred to 
a Medical Panel. The Medical Panel Report dated December 11, 
1984 authored by three physicians concluded that the Plaintiff 
suffered from the following medical problems: 
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A. 15% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due 
to the industrial accident of 11/11/82 as the result of 
loss of body function. Tr. 258. 
B. 20% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due 
to pre-existing conditions broken down as follows: 
(1) 30% loss of body function of the left upper ex-
tremity for the pre-existing industrial injury of 
1977. Tr. 257. 
(2) 7% loss of body function of the right foot for the 
pre-existing injury of 1960 or 1961. Tr. 257. 
C. 32% permanent partial impairment of the whole body for 
loss of body function from all causes and conditions. 
Tr. 276. 
The Plaintiff is a 41-year-old former truck driver who did 
not finish the fifth grade in school. Tr. 276, 288. The sever-
ity of his various impairments, all of which make it impossible 
for him to return to his former work, or any other gainful activ-
ity, were vividly underscored by him in the manner in which he 
testified, as well as in his appearance and demeanor at his hear-
ing. He further indicated that his present activities involved 
watering his lawn, taking walks, pulling weeds and "puttering" 
around his house. Tr. 75-76. His mental impairment, clearly 
observable during his testimony, was subsequently underscored by 
Dr. Moench in his consultative examination. 
Plaintiff's overall physical condition, based upon the new 
records filed from St. Marks Hospital, indicate that he now ex-
periences grand mal seizures on a weekly basis (Tr. 332), which 
is substantially more than was previously found in the prior 
medical evidence; and this additional change in his condition 
underscores both the applicability of a permanent total disabil-
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ity claim, as well as the need for the taking of additional test-
imony relative to his changed condition. In this regard, and as 
was communicated to the Administrative Law Judge, it was antici-
pated that testimony on this point would be given by the Plain-
tiff, his wife, and others, in addition to a medical report to be 
received from Mr. Spencer's treating physician, as referred to 
above. Tr. 351. 
Subsequent to the entry of the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision in this case, the Plaintiff submitted new medical (Tr . 
367-370, 331-335) and rehabilitation data (Tr. 314-330), and has 
further produced evidence tending to show a continuing deteriora-
tion of his mental and physical condition and his continuing 
unemployability. Tr. 363. 
The Plaintiff specifically requested of both the Administra-
tive Law Judge and the Industrial Commission that his original 
Motion for Reconsideration addressed to the Administrative Law 
Judge be held in abeyance for an appropriate period of time to 
allow for the filing of a detailed treating physician's report 
and other medical records previously requested addressing the 
only issue remaining in this case, namely, the Plaintiff's unem-
ployability. Tr. 351. 
Plaintiff filed a four-page detailed medical letter addres-
sing the Plaintiff's unemployability and the effect that his 
medical condition has had upon that status (Tr. 367-370), as well 
as a letter report from a consulting neurologist concerning a 
neurological examination performed during the latter part of last 
year (Tr. 371), neither of which was examined by either the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge or by the Industrial Commission before 
entering the final Order herein. 
In addition to the said medical reports and records, the 
Plaintiff's treating physician also referred the Plaintiff to the 
University of Utah Medical Center for additional and heretofore 
untried medical tests in an effort to attempt to define the 
Plaintiff's problems, and to determine whether they are of a 
physical or mental etiology. Tr. 367. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify or change former findings where such is justified. In 
dismissing Plaintiff's Application for Hearing, the Industrial 
Commission violated a basic tenet of administrative law by acting 
capriciously and arbitrarily. To supports its capricious and 
arbitrary action, the Industrial Commission relied upon the doc-
trine of res judicata. 
In relying upon the doctrine of res judicata and by ignoring 
Plaintiff's new medical evidence, the Industrial Commission has 
prohibited Plaintiff from even applying for benefits to which he 
might be entitled. 
This Court should not condone such action by the Industrial 
Commission and, therefore, must reverse the Industrial Commis-




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS 
CONTINUING JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT TO MODIFY AWARDS 
• • • - • • • - ' 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-78 of Utah Workers1 Compensation 
Act (1981) empowers the Industrial Commission with continuing 
jurisdiction by providing as follows: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing, and it 
may from time to time make such modification 
or change with respect to former findings, or 
orders with respect thereto, as in its opin-
ion may be justified, provided, however ... 
In the landmark decision of Buxton v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Utah, 587 P.2d 121 (1978), a unanimous Utah Supreme 
Court confirmed that the clear and unambiguous language of §35-1-
78 "empowers the Commission to make such modifications of former 
findings and orders as f in its opinion may be justified111. Id. 
at 123. See also Mecham v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 
692 P.2d 783 (1984) wherein the Court affirmed Buxton. 
In construing Section 35-1-78 this Court has required, as a 
basis for modification "evidence of some significant change or 
new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous 
award's inadequacy." Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952, 953 (1967). 
Buxton, supra at 123. 
Professor Larson in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Section 81.31(e) (Supp. July 1985), notes that f,a change in 
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Claimant's ability to get or hold employment, or to maintain his 
earlier earning level, should be considered a 'change in condi-
tion1, even though Claimants physical condition may have re-
mained unchanged." 
Applying the foregoing authorities to the instant case, it 
becomes evident that the Industrial Commission acted capriciously 
and arbitrarily in denying Plaintiff a hearing on the issue of 
whether he is now permanently and totally disabled. 
On January 2, 1986, the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge which denied Plaintiff the 
opportunity for a hearing to present evidence in support of his 
claim that the previous award should be modified,. The Adminis-
trative Law Judge construed Section 35-1-78 narrowly and errone-
ously as requiring only "a change in condition". Tr . 344. As 
established above, this Court has interpreted that section as re-
quiring "some change pr new,development in claimant's injury or 
proof of the previous award fs inadequacy .ff Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, supra. [Emphasis added]. 
The Administrative Law Judge merely examined one report from 
the St. Marks Hospital Emergency Room to deny Plaintiff the right 
to a hearing. Tr. 343. It is submitted that if the Administra-
tive Law Judge can deny any qualified applicant, such as the 
Plaintiff, the right to a hearing based upon one report, then the 
constitutional principles upon which our system of jurisprudence 
are built will surely disintegrate. 
Plaintiff has certainly demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
previous award. Not only has the Social Security Administration 
of the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
determined that the Applicant is totally disabled from all lines 
of suitable, gainful employment (Tr. 348), but the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services of the Utah State Office of Education 
concluded that Plaintiff was not a feasible candidate for compet-
itive employment and there is no reasonable expectation of voca-
tional rehabilitation. Tr. 314-330. 
These findings of total disability and no reasonable expect-
ation of vocational rehabilitation coupled with the irrefutable 
fact that Plaintiff has not been employed since his accident are 
strong evidence that the May 29, 1985 (Tr. 306-307) award of 
benefits is inadequate. 
Additionally, the Plaintiff has proferred new medical evi-
dence indicating not only the need for continuing medical treat-
ment, but also demonstrating change in his injury. 
Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case justifying the 
change of his disability rating from partial to total. The Com-
mission's refusal "to make findings and an award of permanent 
total disability is so contrary to reason that it is capricious 
and arbitrary11. Buxton, supra at 124. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING 
THE DOCTRINE! OF RES JUDICATA IN DENYflftT 
THE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
In dismissing Plaintiff's Application for Hearing (Tr. 343-
344), the Administrative Law Judge injected the doctrine of res 
judicata into this case for the purpose of supporting his deci-
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sion. Tr. 344. This is a questionable attempt by the Adminis-
trative Law Judge to preserve a viable doctrine of law which has 
no application to the instant case. 
This Court in Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 
398 P.2d 880 (1965), held that the ordinary rule of res judicata 
is not applicable to cases such as the present case. In Mollerup 
Van Lines, the Plaintiff was awarded a supplemental award by the 
Commission. Affirming the Commission's award the Court stated: 
The ordinary rule of res judicata is not 
applicable to the instant proceeding. Inher-
ent in the act is recognition that industrial 
injuries cannot always be diagnosed with 
absolute accuracy, nor their consequences 
predicted with complete certainty. Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953 provides that "the pow-
ers and jurisdiction of the Commission over 
each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or 
change with respect to former findings, or 
others with respect thereto, as in its opin-
ion may be justified11. Accordingly, even 
though the Commission has made an award, if 
there later develops some substantial change 
or new development with respect to the injury 
than was known or was contemplated at the 
time of the original award, upon proper pro-
ceedings the Commission can make such adjust-
ment as is just and reasonable and in con-
formity with the act. _Id_. at 883. 
In the instant case, the issue of permanent total disability 
was considered by the Administrative Law Judge who specifically 
found that a finding of tentative permanent and total disability 
was not being "made at this time". Tr. 306. 
Upon receiving credible and uncontradicted evidence support-
ing Plaintiff1s claim for a finding of permanent total disabil-
ity, the Administrative Law Judge ignored this Court's construc-
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tion of §35-1-78 and hid behind the walls of the doctrine of res 
judicata to dismiss Plaintiff's Application for Hearing. Tr. 
344. 
Based upon this Court's ruling that the doctrine of res 
judicata is not applicable to cases such as this, it is submitted 
that the Commissioner's Order dated January 2, 1986, affirming 
the Administrative Law Judge's award of November 15, 1985, must 
be reversed and this case must be remanded for a hearing. 
Ill 
IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT RESPECTING THE 
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION, SUCH DOUBT SHOULD 
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLbYffF 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that one of the 
permanent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect 
the employee and those dependent upon him in the event the 
employee is seriously injured or killed. Prows v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363 (1980), citing Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 1021-1022, 
(1919). To achieve this purpose the Court has consistently es-
poused the view that "in case there is any doubt respecting the 
right to compensation, such doubt must be resolved in favor of 
the employee". Prows, supra at 1364. See also McPhie v. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977). If such doubt 
exists here, it should be resolved in favor of the Plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the Planitiff is totally dis-
abled. The medical records and findings by both the Social 
Security Administration of the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services and the Division of Rehabilitation Services of 
the Utah State Office of Education support Plaintiff's claim for 
total permanent disability benefits. 
Despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence, the 
Industrial Commission has refused-to Plaintiff a hearing to pres-
ent his claim for permanent total disability benefits. 
This refusal by the Industrial Commission is an unconscion-
able abuse of discretion. Although this Court must give weight 
to decisions rendered by the Industrial Commission, to affirm the 
decision in this matter would be a signal to the Industrial Com-
mission that it can ignore sound principles of law and valid 
evidence in rendering completely arbitrary and capricious deci-
sions . 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, and upon all documents 
contained in this Court's record, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Industrial Commission's decision denying Plaintiff a 
right to a hearing must be reversed. 
DATED this _J2S}j£ day of May, 1986. 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 1, 198A, at 8:30 o'clock 
a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius Dabney, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney 
at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues and 
questions were submitted to a Medical Panel appointed by the Administrative 
Law Judge. The Medical Panel Report was received and copies were distributed 
to the parties. Applicant, by and through counsel, filed objections to the 
Medical Panel Report, alleging that the Applicant's total impairment due to 
all causes and conditions was 45% rather than the 32% as found by the Panel, 
and that the Panel had failed to rate the Applicant's psychiatric impairment. 
With regard to the first allegation, the Administrative Law Judge notes that 
the 45% rating is the rating of the treating physician, Dr. Hebertson, and 
represents his opinion of the Applicant's impairment. While not impugning the 
integrity ot the treating physician, the Administrative Law Judge feels that 
the rating of the Medical Panel Report is reasonable, since the Medical Panel 
consisted of an orthopedic surgeon, a psychiatrist, and a neurologist. With 
regard to Applicant's second contention, that the Panel made no rating for 
psychiatric problems, this is clearly erroneous. A careful review of the 
Panel Report will reveal that the Panel gave the Applicant 15% "due to 
factitious seizure disorder and head pain, which are due to psychological 
stresses.'* (Emphasis supplied.) Having reviewed the medical evidence and the 
Medical Panel Report, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the objections 
of the Applicant to the Medical Panel Report should be denied, and the Medical 
Panel Report is admitted into evidence. 
CARL JAY SPENCER 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This case concerns the extent of impairment due to the industrial 
injury of November 11, 1982, and whether there has been any temporary total 
disability as a result of that injury since September 9, 1983, 
The Applicant herein was employed as a truck driver, for the 
Defendant N. V. Swire Bottlers, which bottles Coca-Cola. On November 12, 
1982, the Applicant was driving an eighteen-wheeler back from Denver, 
Colorado, when he sustained an industrial injury. On the prior day, November 
11, 1982, the Applicant was in Wyoming when he was run off the road, and as a 
result sustained multiple contusions of the head, arm, and leg. He was 
discharged although he was apparently a little dazed. He continued on until 
he arrived in Colorado, and at that time he blacked out, wrecking his truck 
and sustaining another head injury. He was taken to the Vail Hospital, but 
had no recall of that treatment. He was returned to Salt Lake City and on 
November 18, 1982, was seen by Dr. Slawson complaining of dizziness, forget-
fulness, and headaches. Dr. Slawson referred Mr. Spencer to the Holy Cross 
Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan, which were normal. Dr. Slawson concluded 
that the Applicant was suffering from a concussion. 
After continuing problems, the Applicant was referred to Dr. Nord for 
an EEG on December 2, 1982, which was unremarkable. He was then referred to 
Dr. Robert Hood and was seen on December 22, 1982, and the doctor concluded 
that Mr. Spencer had a post-cconcussion syndrome. He returned to Drc Hood 
still complaining of blackouts and blurred vision, and at that time it was 
determined that he should see Dr. Wayne Hebertson. 
Dr. Hebertson saw the Applicant on January 31, 1983, and he was seen 
again by the doctor on February 11, 1983, upon his admission to the St. Mark's 
Hospital. While there, he received various diagnostic studies and was 
released on February 15. While in the hospital, he was also seen in a 
psychiatric consultation by Dr. McCann, who felt that the Applicant was having 
conversion reaction symptoms. Mr- Spencer vas started on Dilantin, and was 
told to return for followup to Dr. Hebertson. 
He continued his followup treatment with Dr. Hebertson, and on July 
2, 1983, returned to light duty at his place of employment. His light duty 
consisted of stacking pallets, bottles, and other tasks around the warehouse. 
In September of 1983, the Applicant was advised that there was no more light 
duty available to him, and he was laid off on September 9, 1983. The 
Applicant has not looked for work since his layoff, however, he did testify 
that people have offered him truck driving jobs, but when they are informed of 
his history of seizures, he has not been hired. 
The Applicant's present complaints are that he has constant head-
aches, but that he has no trouble with his vision or hearing, but does have 
some problems with his neck tensing up and getting sore. He has also noticed 
problems with his balance, and some loss of strength in his right arm. 
CARL JAY SPENCER 
ORDER 
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In 1960 or '61, Mr. Spencer had his toes frozen on his right foot, 
which gave him trouble until he had surgery on June 29, 1970. He did well 
following this surgery, until he dropped a garbage can on his toes in July of 
1970, while working for Salt Lake City as a sanitation worker. He continued 
to have chronic pain until Dr. Morrow finally amputated the fourth and fifth 
toes and the fifth metatarsal head on or about January 19, 1971. As a result 
of that surgery, the doctor found that the Applicant had a 7% permanent 
partial impairment of his right foot, and the Applicant was paid benefits in 
the amount of $54.20 per week for 8.4 weeks or a total of $455.28 as a result 
of this injury. At the hearing, the Applicant denied any residual problems 
with his right foot, and also denied that hs used an appliance or prosthetic 
device in his right shoe. 
The Applicant's next injury occurred on or about September 18, 1976. 
At that time, he was working for Salt Lake County and sustained an injury to 
his left shoulder while working. On or about November 18, 1976, the Applicant 
sustained another injury to his left shoulder while lifting garbage cans, when 
he heard a pop and something tear in his left shoulder after lifting a can. 
On January 3, 1977, Dr. Morrow performed a surgical repair of the Applicant's 
left shoulder. He continued to be seen by Dr. Vanderhooft in followup, until 
he was eventually released and given a rating of 30% of the left upper 
extremity. Mr. Spencer was paid 56.16 weeks of permanent partial impairment 
benefits at the rate of $112.67 for this injury by Salt Lake County. 
Since there was an allegation that the Applicant was still temporar-
ily totally disabled beyond ^ September 9, 1983, the date on which he was laid 
off, the file was submitted to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The 
Medical Panel found that the Applicant has not been temporarily totally 
disabled since September 9, 1983, as a result of the industrial injury of 
November 11, 1982. The Panel also found that as a result of the industrial 
injury of November 11, 1982, the Applicant has sustained a 15% permanent 
partial impairment ,fdue to factitious seizure disorder and head pain, which 
are due to psychological stresses." In this regard, the Panel also stated as 
follows: "We find no organic basis for the constant headaches, and no evi-
dence that a bona fide seizure disorder exists. Instead, the Medical Panel 
believes that the patient's symptoms are related to psychological function." 
The Panel also found that there was no aggravation by the industrial injury of 
either the Applicant's pre-existing foot problem or his shoulder problem, and 
that there were no other pre-existing conditions. The Administrative Law 
Judge adopts the findings of the Medical Panel as his own. 
The Applicant, by and through counsel, has urged that a finding of 
tentative permanent and total disability be made in this case, and as support 
thereof he relies upon the "odd lot doctrine" adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Nolan W. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, filed April 5, 1984. In 
reviewing that case, I note that the Court found "A majority of the odd-lot 
cases are concerned with employees whose work required physical labor, and 
many of those employees were fifty years old or older with moderate or little 
education." In this case, the Applicant is thirty-nine years old, which would 
CARL JAY SPENCER 
ORDER 
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hardly classify him as an older worker as anticipated by the odd lot doc-
trine* In addition, the Applicant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was 
that people have offered him truck driving jobs, but after he informs them of 
his history of seizures, he had not been hired. However, the Medical Panel 
found no organic basis for these seizures* Accordingly, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds that the weight of evidence vitiates a finding of tentative 
permanent and total disability, and none will be made at this time. 
In assessing the liability for an industrial injury, it is necessary 
to utilize the Hair formula. Briefly, Hair provides that the impairment due 
to the industrial injury will be assessed as against the remaining unimpaired 
person for rating purposes. In the instant matter, the Applicant had a 7% 
permanent partial impairment of the right foot due to the injury with Salt 
Lake City, and a 30% impairment of the left upper extremity due to his injury 
sustained with Salt Lake County. The 7% right foot impairment equals 2% of 
the whole man, and the 30% left upper extremity rating equals 18% of the whole 
man making a combined pre-existing impairment of 20% of the whole man, thereby 
rendering Mr. Spencer an 80% whole man for rating purposes as of the date of 
his industrial injury. As a result of that injury, he sustained a 15% impair-
ment which when applied to an 80% unimpaired man equals a 12% permanent 
partial impairment due to the industrial injury of November 11, 1982. Since 
the Applicant has previously received benefits for his pre-existing condi-
tions, he is not entitled to an award from the Second Injury Fund, however, 
the carrier, Industrial Indemnity, is entitled to reimbursement of 20/32 or 
63% of the temporary total compensation and/or medical expenses paid on behalf 
of the Applicant as a resulfc-of the industrial injury of November 11, 1092. 
On November 11, 1982, the Applicant was earning wages sufficient to 
entitle him to the maximum award for temporary total disability and permanent 
partial impairment benefits of $284.00 per week and $189.00 per week, respec-
tively. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Carl Jay Spencer is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for 
the industrial accident he sustained on November 11, 1982, which accident 
arose out of or during the course or scope of his employment with the 
Defendant, V. V. Swire Bottlers, Incorporated. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottlers, 
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity, pay Carl Jay Spencer, compensation 
at the rate of $189.00 per week for 37.44 weeks or a total of $7,076.16, as 
compensation for a 12% permanent partial impairment due to the industrial 
injury of November 11, 1982, said benefits to be paid in a lump sum less the 
attorney's fee to be awarded hereinafter. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottler, 
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity, pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for 
the Applicant, the sum of $1,415.23, for services rendered in this matter, the 
same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the Applicant and remitted 
directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottlers, 
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity, pay all medical expenses incurred 
as a result of the industrial injury of November 11, 1982; said benefits to be 
paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, Industrial Indemnity, shall 
be entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for 63% of the 
temporary total compensation and/or medical expenses incurred on behalf of the 
Applicant as a result of the industrial injury of November 11, 1982; said 
reimbursement to be had upon the submission of a verified petition of the 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so expended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof speci-
fying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this 
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
Jiql^ day of May , 1985. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the J??/^ day of May , 1985, a copy of the 
attached Order was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law 
Kearns Building, Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
Industrial Indemnity 
P.O. Box 7905 
Murray, UT 84107 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Carl Jay Spencer 
1318 West 1300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1647 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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On May 29, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this matter. At that time, the 
Administrative Law Judge also ruled on the merits of the Applicant's claim for 
permanent and total disability. No Motion for Review having been filed by the 
Applicant, that finding and Order became the final award of the Commission. 
On October 15, 1985, the Applicant, by and through counsel, filed an 
Application for Hearing seeking interest and permanent and total disability, 
and payment of certain medical expenses. Thereafter, the Defendants, by and 
through counsel, answered the Application, and contended that no further 
proceedings were necessary since all medical expenses incurred as the result 
of the industrial injury had been paid, and there had been no change in the 
Applicant's condition since the Order of May 29, 1985. 
In reviewing the additional evidence which has been submitted, the 
Administrative Law Judge notes that the claimed unpaid medical expenses 
concern an incident which occurred on January 31, 1985. The report from 
St. Mark's Emergency Room indicates: "Wife states husband tripped—falling 
forward catching himself with his arms. Did not hit head. While on the 
ground, wife reports grand mal seizure . . . ." The final diagnosis of the 
hospital was that the Applicant had sustained a cervical strain and a 
contusion of his left wrist. Based on the foregoing account of the incident, 
the Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Spencer tripped and fell, 
sustaining some injuries which were not related to the industrial injury. He 
appears to have had a seizure after he fell, but the seizure did not cause the 
fall. 
Prior to the issuance of the Order of May 29, 1985, the Applicant, by 
and through counsel, had fully briefed and plead the issue of permanent and 
total disability. Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge ruled on the 
merits of that claim, and found that the Applicant was not permanently and 
totally disabled. If the Applicant disagreed with that finding at that time, 
he should have filed a Motion for Review with the Commission, and he should 
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have obtained an extension to secure a report from the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services.- Instead, the Applicant let the Order of May 29, 
1985, become final. Now, the Applicant seeks to invoke the provisions of 
Section 78 to modify the prior finding with respect to permanent total 
disability, although he did not see fit to appeal that finding. Section 78 
provides that the Commission shall exercise continuing jurisdiction over 
claims, and by case law this has been interpreted as requiring a change in 
condition. In reviewing the file, I note that there has been no change in the 
Applicant's condition. Rather, the only "change" has been the submission of a 
report from the Division of Rehabilitation Services. However, this is not 
evidence of a change per se, since this issue was extensively and fully raised 
by Applicant's counsel prior to the entry of the Order of May 29, 1985. 
Therefore, if the term res judicata is to have any meaning or effect at all, 
then the latest Application for Hearing of the Applicant contending that he is 
permanently and totally disabled must be dismissed. Otherwise, the doctrine 
of res judicata will be an empty phrase, honored more in its breach than in 
its acceptance. If the issue of permanent total disability had not previously 
been addressed, then the Application for Hearing of the Applicant would be 
meritorious; but to use such a filing as a means of avoiding the error of not 
filing a timely appeal is a subterfuge and procedural miscarriage which the 
Administrative Law Judge will not be a party to. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Hearing of Carl Jay 
Spencer claiming additional medical expenses for a trip and fall on January 
31, 1985, and permanent and total disability should be, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be riled in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof; 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections; and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
Jd'.fJi day of November, 1985^  
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on November J5 1985, a copy of the attached 
Order in the case of Carl Jay Spencer issued November t~ 1985, was 
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law 
Kearns Building, Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Industrial Indemnity 
P.O. Box 7905 
Murray, UT 84107 
Carl Jay Spencer 
1318 West 1300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1647 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On or about November 15, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about December 6, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The C^iission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of t* opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the A ^inistra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of November 15, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
AiAl 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 





- ^ jiay of January, 1986. 
ATTEST:/ , 
> ^ ; 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January _i£_ » 1986, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Carl Jay Spencer, issued 
January_j2^ 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Carl Jay Spencer, 1318 West 1300 South, SLC, UT 84104 
Virginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, #412, SLC, UT 84101 
Industrial Indemnity, P. 0. Box 7905, Murray, UT 84107 
Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P. 0. Box 3000, SLC, UT 84110 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc., P. 0. Box 1647, SLC, UT 84110 
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